The Flax Paradox in Kazakhstan: Unraveling the Arithmetic Discrepancy

The Bureau of National Statistics of Kazakhstan released data on oilseed stocks as of July 1, 2026. According to these figures, the country's flaxseed stocks amounted to 484 thousand tons. At first glance, this suggests a comfortable supply ahead of the new harvest. However, when compared with production, imports, exports, and domestic consumption, the official arithmetic starts to diverge.

The same Bureau reports that gross flaxseed production in 2025 was 1.351 million tons. The report does not provide data on the adjusted weight, so to assess the commercial resource, one must consider refaction—losses during processing, cleaning, drying, and bringing the product to market condition.

Assuming a refaction rate of 20%, the post-processing production would be around 1.080 million tons. Considering the carry-in stocks at the start of the season of about 186 thousand tons and official imports from September to May of around 33 thousand tons, the total supply is estimated at approximately 1.299 million tons.

During the same period, exports amounted to about 1.081 million tons. Adding domestic consumption of around 100 thousand tons, the calculated ending stock is only about 118 thousand tons. However, official statistics show 484 thousand tons, a gap of about 366 thousand tons.

Even under a softer scenario with a refaction rate of 10%, post-processing production increases to 1.216 million tons. In this case, the calculated ending stock would be about 254 thousand tons, still nearly half of the officially reported 484 thousand tons. The gap remains around 230 thousand tons.

In other words, even the most optimistic scenario does not explain the official stock figures. To reach 484 thousand tons of flax by July 1, either the actual production was significantly higher than reported, or the imports were much larger than reflected in official statistics.

This is where the intriguing part begins.

In previous seasons, the flax market's balance sheet was comprehensible: production, exports, imports, and stocks formed a clear picture. However, during the 2025/26 marketing year, after changes in trade conditions for Russian flax in the European market, the numbers started behaving differently.

European tariffs sharply reduced the direct competitiveness of Russian flax in the EU. In this context, Kazakhstan gained a strong advantage as a supplier to the European market. Kazakhstan's export rates increased, demand strengthened, and the origin of Kazakhstan became particularly valuable.

But the question arises: was the entire exported volume truly grown within Kazakhstan?

Based on the published data, the question becomes apparent. A simple balance check shows that with the current inputs, such a volume of flax could not have been generated solely by domestic harvest and officially recorded imports.

Therefore, two explanations are possible.

First, the actual harvest or production in adjusted weight was higher than the available data suggests. This is theoretically possible.

Second, the import flow was significantly higher than officially declared. Given the geography, trade structure, and border market activity, the most likely source of such an additional resource could be Russian flax. In this case, we might be talking about supplies not fully reflected in official statistics or registered with volume distortions.

This is not direct proof of illegal imports. However, it is a significant balance signal: the official figures for production, imports, exports, and stocks do not reconcile.

An additional question is infrastructural. If stocks on July 1 truly amount to 484 thousand tons, where is this volume physically stored? Are there enough storage facilities, considering the approaching new harvest already in the fields of Kazakhstan? If real stocks are so large, the market should face pressure on elevator capacity and logistics before the new season.

There is also a commercial question. Could Kazakhstan profit from the deficit caused by restricted direct access of Russian flax to the European market? Certainly, yes. But if a significant part of the resource was indeed Russian, the question arises: is the market cutting the branch it's sitting on? The more such flows occur, the higher the risk of scrutiny from buyers, regulators, and tax authorities.

The particularly sensitive topic is the return of VAT on export operations. If part of the exported volume was not grown in Kazakhstan and was not officially imported in full, the question arises: on what basis were tax obligations and returns formed for this volume? This is not only a market balance issue but also a fiscal transparency issue.

In conclusion, Kazakhstan's flax balance for the 2025/26 marketing year leaves more questions than answers. Either the country harvested and preserved more flax than current calculations show, or imports were significantly higher than officially reported. But one thing is clear: with the available data, the arithmetic does not add up.

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Below is the updated flax seed balance in Kazakhstan for the 2025/26 marketing year, considering actual production, imports, and exports from September to May, as well as officially stated stocks (with refaction scenarios of 20%, 15%, and 10%).

The explanation of the figures in this balance (partially repeated from what was written above):

According to the Bureau of National Statistics of Kazakhstan, gross flaxseed production amounted to about 1.351 million tons. Considering processing, if we take the historically average refaction estimate of the Grain Union at 20%, production in net weight is about 1.08 million tons. Also, according to the Bureau of National Statistics (BNS), flaxseed stocks as of July 1, 2025, were 229 thousand tons. With exports in July and August, the 2025/2026 season started with 186 thousand tons of stocks, not 19 thousand tons as stated by the Grain Union of Kazakhstan. Imports according to BNS from September to May amounted to about 33 thousand tons. Thus, the total supply is estimated at approximately 1.299 million tons.

During this time, exports from September to May already amounted to 1.081 million tons, and domestic consumption is estimated at about 100 thousand tons. As a result, the ending stock of flax is around 118 thousand tons. However, BNS-published stock data as of July 1, 2026, shows a significantly higher volume—484 thousand tons. Therefore, the balance gap is about 366 thousand tons. (And if we take the initial stock of the Grain Union at 19 thousand tons, then Kazakhstan has no raw material for further export by the end of May).

Even using a more optimistic scenario with a refaction of 10% (which is more likely), post-processing production increases to 1.216 million tons, and the ending stock to 254 thousand tons. Yet, even in this case, it remains significantly below the officially stated 484 thousand tons. The gap remains at around 230 thousand tons.

This indicates that the official figures do not reconcile. At the current level of gross harvest, import, and export, it is impossible to simultaneously achieve the declared stock volume. To form a stock of 484 thousand tons, significantly higher production (which is impossible even if 1% of the gross harvest is taken for processing) or a much larger import volume than reflected in official statistics is required.

Consequently, the published data suggests one of two scenarios: either Kazakhstan's flaxseed stocks are statistically inflated, or the import flow is significantly underestimated. Considering trade geography, high activity of Russian flax in the border market, and Kazakhstan's record export rates, the most likely explanation is the presence of an additional influx of Russian-origin flax, not fully reflected in official import statistics.

This calculation is not direct proof of illegal imports, but it shows a significant balance gap that cannot be explained solely by officially reflected production, import, and export.

We also attach the balance of previous seasons, compiled by the Grain Union of Kazakhstan.

Data from the Grain Union of Kazakhstan. This balance is attached for dynamic assessment.